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I am obligated to defend the life and honor of Russian Citizens,
wherever they may be. We will not let those responsible for the deaths
of our people go unpunished.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 8, 2008, Russia invaded 2 the sovereign nation of
Georgia. 3 In doing so, Russia claimed it was acting in self-defense of its
citizens living in Georgia and located predominantly in the region of
South Ossetia.4 Russian forces went well beyond South Ossetia and
invaded further into Georgian territory, and remained in Georgian
territory for approximately two months.5
This Article analyzes the legality of the stated Russian justification
for invading Georgia-defense of its citizens. This Article will first
provide a background on the conflict in South Ossetia. 6 The Article will
then examine the law applicable to a state's defense of its nationals
abroad. Finally, it will apply the law and historical examples to
determine the legality of the Russian invasion. While it is recognized
that there may be additional justifications for the Russian invasion, this
1. Tony Karon, Has Georgia Overreached in Ossetia?,TIME, Aug. 9, 2008, availableat
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1831073,00.html (quoting Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev).
2. The terms "invasion," "intervention," "interdiction," and "incursion" are synonymous
for the purpose of describing the entry of Russian armed forces into Georgian territory.
3. Russia Completes Troop Pullout from S. Ossetia Buffer Zone, RIA Novosti, Oct. 08,
2008, http://en.rian.rulworld/20081008/117600495.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Due to the recentness of Russia's incursion into Georgia and the conflict in South
Ossetia (Aug. 2008), many sources for this Article are from the Internet or news agencies.
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Article focuses primarily on the defense of nationals abroad
justification. It evaluates both Russia's claim that some South Ossetian
residents were its citizens, 7 as well as the legitimacy of the claim that it
acted in their defense. This Article applies the known facts of the
invasion to the international law that allows state armed attacks in
certain limited circumstances and compares it to other invasions that
have used a similar justification.
This Article raises numerous questions regarding the legitimacy of
Russia's justification for invading Georgia. For example, does Russia's
responsibility to protect its nationals abroad trigger a right to an
invasion? Is an invasion proportional to Russia's need to defend its
citizens? Is Georgia's alleged targeting of Russian inhabitants of South
Ossetia, an internationally recognized Georgian territory, enough
justification for Russia to invade Georgia? Does Georgia's failure to
protect Russian citizens when using armed aggression to regain control
of South Ossetia justify Russia's invasion? These questions must be
analyzed in determining whether Russia was justified in invading
Georgia to protect its citizens. Ultimately, this Article concludes that
Russia's invasion of Georgia was not legitimate because it violated
international law.
II. BACKGROUND
Georgia, sitting between Russia and Turkey along the Black Sea,
contains two Russian-backed separatist regions-South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.8 Established by the former Soviet Union in 1922, South
Ossetia comprises a semi-autonomous region in northern Georgia,
governing the region effectively independent from Georgia. 9 A similar
North Ossetian autonomous region exists within Russia dividing the
Ossetia ethnic group between Russia and Georgia.' 0 The region has
proclaimed its independence from Georgia, but no state recognized
South Ossetia as an independent state when the conflict began."
Sizeable portions of South Ossetia are populated mainly by Georgians,
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. Reports: 6 Die as Georgia Shells South Ossetia, CNN.coM, Aug. 2, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/02/georgia. ossetia/index.html#cnnSTCText (last
visited Jan. 24, 2011).
9.

PETER ROUDIK, LAw LIBR. OF CONG., RUSSIAN FEDERATION: LEGAL ASPECTS OF WAR

2 (2008). Not much bigger than Rhode Island, South Ossetia is semi-autonomous
but not recognized by the international community as independent. Karon, supra note 1.
IN GEORGIA

10. ROUDIK, supranote 9, at 2.

11. AMNESTY INT'L, CIVILIANS IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE GEORGIA RUSSIA CONFLICT 7
(2008). Russia (Aug. 26, 2008) and Nicaragua (Sept. 5, 2008) recognized South Ossetia's
independence after the Russian invasion of Georgia, but during the Russian-Georgia conflict. Id.
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and continue to be governed by Georgia.' 2 In 2003, Georgia's current
president, Mikheil Saakashvili, took office amidst the "Rose
Revolution," making the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity a
priority.' 3 South Ossetia remains an internationally recognized part of

Georgia.14
Shortly after the break-up of the Soviet Union, an agreement
established the stationing of Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian
peacekeeping units in South Ossetia.15 Russia has supported South
Ossetian independence since the break-up of the Soviet Union.16 i
2006, Russia began to 7ant Russian citizenship to South Ossetians and
issue them passports. Russia's claim of defense of its citizens within
Georgia as justification for its invasion is based on these grants of
citizenship.

III. THE CONFLICT
The five-day conflict between Georgia and Russia began on the
night of August 7, 2008. Tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia
were high throughout the first week of August and involved armed
skirmishes.19 Under the protection of Russian forces, South Ossetia
sought to expel ethnic Georgians from the region during the first few
days of August.20 At 1900 on August 7, 2008, Georgian President
12. Id.
13. US.: Russia Trying to Topple Georgia Government, CNN.coM, Aug. 11, 2008,
(last
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/1 0/un.georgia/index.html#cnnSTCText
visited Jan. 24, 2011). The Rose Revolution occurred when a pro-Russian government in
Georgia was replaced by one promoting western democracy. Robert Maginnis, Russian Invasion
of Georgia is an East-West Tipping Point, HuM. EVENTS ONLINE, Aug. 10, 2008,
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=27975 (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
14. South Ossetia Shootings Heighten Georgia Tension, CNN.cOM, July 4, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/04/georgia.ossetia/index.html#cnnSTCText (last
visited Jan. 24, 2011). Several U.N. Security Council Resolutions affirm the international
recognition of South Ossetia as part of Georgia. Reaction to Russia's Recognition of Rebels,
BBC NEWs, Aug. 26, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/7582367.stm (last visited Jan. 24,
2011) (quoting leaders such as former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary-General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer confirming international
recognition of South Ossetia as part of Georgia).
15. ROuDIK, supra note 9, at 2; South Ossetia Shootings Heighten Georgia Tension, supra
note 14.
16. ROUDIK,supra note 9, at 3.
17. Id. at 2.
18. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 11, at 9.
19. Georgia 'Under Attack' as Russian Tanks Roll In, CNN, Aug. 8, 2008, available at
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?optioncom-content&task-view&id=5443&ltemid=69
[hereinafter Georgia 'UnderAttack].
20. ROUDIK, supranote 9, at 3.
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Mikheil Saakashvili declared a unilateral ceasefire. 2' That same night,
after announcing that Georgian villages were being shelled and seeking
to crack down on the separatists,22 Georgia launched an armed attack on
the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, at approximately 2300.23 By the
next day, Russia retaliated with an armed invasion of South Ossetia
after Georgia had gained control of the region. 24 Within forty-eight
hours, the Russian military subdued Georgian armed forces and
continued its invasion into the sovereign Georgian territory beyond
South Ossetia, even attacking within proximity of the Georgian capital
of Tbilisi.2 5 On August 12, 2008, Russia agreed to a truce, ending
operations in Georgia, althouPh it remained in Georgia for a
considerable time after this date. 2

IV. GEORGIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
As armed skirmishes began and continued the first week of August
2008 between the Georgian government and South Ossetia, Georgia
*
its right to protect its territorial integrity. 27
claimed it was executing
International law afforded Georgia the right to maintain its territorial
21. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 11, at 9.
22. C.J. Chivers & Ellen Barry, Georgia Claims on Russia War Called Into Question,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at Al; Georgia 'Under Attack,' supra note 19; Luke Harding, EU
Asked to PinpointAggressor in Russia-Georgia War, GUARDIAN, Nov. 18, 2008, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/18/russia-georgia-war. New accounts have called
into question Georgia's assertion that it was acting defensively against South Ossetian
separatists. Chivers & Barry, supra, at Al. The true reason for Georgia's attack of the South
Ossetia region is immaterial to this Article, which focuses solely on the legitimacy of Russia's
justification for invading Georgia of acting in defense of its citizens.
23. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 11, at 9. Originally, Georgia stated that it launched its
attack on South Ossetia to restore constitutional order throughout the region. Dmitry Avaliani et
al., How the Georgian War Began: IWPR-TrainedReporters Investigate the Tragic Sequence of
Events that Triggered War in South Ossetia, CAUCASUS REPORTING SERV., No. 456 (Inst. for

War and Peace Reporting), Aug. 22, 2008, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=346346&apc
state=henh; Georgia 'Under Attack,' supra note 19. However, this is disputed as Georgian
President Saakashvili stated on August 13, 2008 that Georgia responded to a Russian invasion
of tanks into Georgian Territory. Countdown in the Caucuses: Seven Days that Brought Russia
and Georgia to War, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af25400a-739d11 dd-8a66-0000779fdl8c.html?nclick check=1 (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). The actual reason is
immaterial to this Article, which focuses solely on the legitimacy of one sovereign state
invading another based on a claim of defense of the formers' citizens.
24. Karon, supra note 1.
25. ROUDIK, supra note 9, at 2; AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 11, at 11; Kelly Hearn, Bush

Condemns "Brutal" Russian Invasion; UN. Stands Powerless as Forces Near Georgian
Capital,WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at Al.
26. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 11, at 10.

27. Chivers & Barry, supra note 22, at Al.
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integrity and political unity.28 In order for parts or all of South Ossetia
to assert its independence against Georgia, as part of Georgian territory,
it must either have had the right to self-determination or have been
viewed as a "power" under Common Article 2 of the Geneva
Conventions. 29 Otherwise, actions by South Ossetia are internal to
Georgia and can be dealt with as Georgia deems fit.
South Ossetia's geographic location and status internationally were
important in determining whether it had a right to move for
independence against Georgia. Generally, only those people living in
non-contiguous separate territorial units have a right to selfdetermination.36 South Ossetia lacked the right to self-determination
because it lies within the contiguous, internationally-recognized
sovereign borders of Georgia. Equally as limiting for South Ossetia is
the fact that no country had recognized its independence at the time of
the conflict with Georgia.3 ' However, portions of the region had been
operating effectively independent from Georgia while other portions
continued to be governed by Georgia. Ultimately, Georgia's right to
maintain territorial integrity arguably trumped the rights of South
Ossetia to create an independent state.32 The conflict between South
Ossetia and Georgia was likely an internal conflict or domestic action.
Therefore, Georgia was bound only by Common Article III to the
Geneva Conventions, requiring humane treatment without distinction of
those not involved in hostilities, when taking action to maintain its
territorial integrity. 33 Georgia had a right to maintain its territorial
boundaries and political independence with necessary force particularly
in response to the efforts by South Ossetia to expel ethnic Georgians
and in response to any armed attack being delivered upon it by South
Ossetia. But would legitimate efforts by Georgia imperil Russian
citizens in a manner that would allow Russian intervention?

28. See Christian J. Garris, Bosnia and the Limits of InternationalLaw, 34 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 1039, 1066 (1994).
29. See Duncan B. Hollis, Accountability in Chechnya-AddressingInternal Matters with
Legal and PoliticalNorms, 36 B.C. L. REV. 793, 812-19 (1995).
30. Id. at 819-20.
31. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 11, at 7.
32. See Garris,supra note 28, at 1067.
33. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
287.
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V. JUSTIFICATION
Russia's stated justification for its invasion of Georgia was the
necessity to defend its citizens in South Ossetia from Georgian armed
aggression. 34 Essentially, Russia claimed that Georgia had failed in its
"responsibility to protect"" its inhabitants, many of whom were
Russian citizens. The Russian Ambassador gave Russia's official
position to the U.N. Security Council:
I have the hono[]r to assure you that the use of force by the
Russian side is strictly proportionate to the scale of the attack and
pursues no other goal but to protect the Russian peacekeeping
contingent and citizens of the Russian Federation from the illegal
actions of the Georgian side and to prevent future armed attacks
against them. . . . The use of force by the Russian side in self-

defen[s]e will continue until the circumstances that brought it
about cease to exist. 36
Russia claimed a right to defend its citizens in Georgian territory. 37
In insisting its actions were justified, Russia claimed that its citizens
were being killed by Georgian armed forces in South Ossetia.38 MOSCOW
pledged that it sought only to restore the status quo in South Ossetia
where its citizens resided.3 9 Russia cited a constitutional mandate
requiring it to protect its citizens in South Ossetia from alleged harm
caused by Georgia.4 0 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev also strongly
asserted that Georgia had launched cruel attacks in South Ossetia killing
Russian citizens.
President Medvedev stated that Russia "will not allow the deaths of
our compatriots to go unpunished," and "those guilty will receive due
punishment. My duty as Russian president is to safeguard the lives and
dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they are. This is what is behind
34. ROUDIK, supra note 9, at 3.
35.

See GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 4-5 (2008). Responsibility to

protect is a recent concept in international relations asserting that states have a duty not to
mistreat their populations. Id.
36. Letter from Vitaly Churkin, Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2008/545 (Aug. 11, 2008) (on file with author).
37. SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, UPDATE REPORT: GEORGIA, No. 2 (Aug. 12, 2008),

available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.4423477/.
38. Maginnis, supra note 13.
39. Oliver Knox, Bush: Russia Must Reverse Course in Georgia, AGENCE FR. PRESSE,
Aug. 11, 2008, availableat 2008 WL 120229.
40. Hearn, supra note 25.
41. Vladimir Rayuhin, Medvedev, Putin Accuse Georgia of Genocide, HINDU, Aug. 11,
2008, availableat http://www.hindu.com/2008/08/l1/stories/2008081156011500.htm.
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the logic of the steps we are undertaking now." 42 He characterized the
Georgian attack on South Ossetia as an act of aggression against
Russian citizens even though it was an attack entirely within the
sovereign territory of Georgia. 43 He compared alleged attacks on
Russian citizens suffered in South Ossetia at the hands of Georgia
armed forces to the attacks United States citizens suffered on 11
September 2001." Russian leaders went so far as to say the invasion
was justified because of the need to protect Russian citizens living in
South Ossetia from "genocide" by the Georgian armed forces, and it
must protect its citizens using military means, if necessary.
VI. USE OF FORCE
Before the justification can be reviewed, the international law basis
for such use of force must be examined. Russia's justification for using
military force to protect its nationals abroad finds its roots in customary
international law and the U.N. Charter (Charter). Both sources of law
are crucial in determining the legitimacy of the justification.
A. Customary InternationalLaw
The use of force in self-defense has long predated the United
Nations as a key part of customary international law and proper
century, war was
application of jus ad bellum.46 Before the twentieth
47 Hugo Grotius first
disputes.
settle
to
for
states
seen as a legal method
recognized three requirements for invoking the right to self-defense: (1)
an immediate danger; (2) defensive actions are necessary to defend
against the threat; and (3) the necessary actions are proportionate to the
threat.4 8 Grotius, noted as the father of international law,4 9 articulated
self-defense principles (imminence and necessity) using human
42. Georgia 'Under Attack, 'supra note 19.
43. ROUDIK, supranote 9, at 8.

44. Dmitry Medvedev, Remarks at the Meeting of the Russian President with the
Participants in the International Valdai Club (Sept. 12, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speecbes/2008/09/12/1644_type82912type82917type84779_2064
09.sbtml).
45. ROUDIK, supra note 9, at 9.
46. Ziyad Motala & David T. ButleRitchie, Self-Defense in InternationalLaw, The United
Nations, and the Bosnian Conflict, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 10 (1995); Robert A. Zayac, Jr.,
United States' Authority to Legally Implement the Self-Defense and Anticipatory Self-Defense
Doctrines to Eradicate the Threat Posed by Countries Harboring Terrorists and Producing
Weapons of Mass Destruction,29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 433, 438 (2005).
47. Motala & ButleRitchie, supra note 46, at 15.
48. Id. at 10.
49. MOHAMMAD TAGHI KAROUBI, JUST OR UNJUST WAR? 70 (2004).
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reasoning.
1. CarolineDoctrine
From the Caroline case emerged the doctrine widely held to be the
basis for modern customary international law on the use of force in selfdefense officially recognizing the requirements Grotius had
promulgated.5 1 R.Y. Jennings, writing in 1938, stated that the Caroline
case moved self-defense from a political excuse to a legal doctrine. 52
The Caroline incident happened during the Canadian rebellion of
1837.5 Many Americans were sympathetic with the Canadian rebels
opposing British rule, especially near the Canadian border, and the U.S.
government was not able to quell the sympathizers' support of the
rebels.5 4 British forces decided to destroy the Caroline, an American
ship operating in and around Canadian and British waters, to hinder the
rebels' efforts.5 5 When the British first targeted the Caroline, she had
made her wa into Canadian waters and was being used in support of
the rebellion. 6 But by the time the British attacked her, she had made
her way back into U.S. territory. 57 Ultimately, the British forces set the
Carolineon fire and destroyed the ship.58
The British asserted self-defense as justification for its actions.59 On
April 24, 1841, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster sent a letter to
Henry Fox, the British minister in Washington, expressing the formula
for what has become modern customary international law on selfdefense. The letter stated, "It will be for [the British] government to
show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." 61 It has become
commonly accepted that the general rule and basic elements for the
legitimate use of force in self-defense under customary international law

50. Jason A. Wrachford, The 2006 IsraeliInvasion of Lebanon: Aggression, Self-Defense,
or a Reprisal Gone Bad?, 60 A.F. L. REv. 29, 51-52 (2007). St. Augustine and St. Thomas
Aquinas preceded Grotius with their just war theory based on Christian theology. See KAROUBI,
supra note 49, at 62-63, 67.
51. Motala & ButleRitchie, supra note 46, at 10.
52. R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am. J. INT'L L. 82, 82 (1938).
53. Id
54. Id.
55. Id. at 82-83.
56. Id. at 83.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 85.
60. Id. at 89.
61.

DANIEL WEBSTER, THE DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER,

WILE SECRETARY OF STATE 110 (1848).
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was set out in the letter.62 With the requirement of proportionality
augmenting Grotius' requirements of necessity and immediacy,
Secretary Webster's assertion makes up the Caroline Doctrine.6 3
2. Immediacy
Secretary Webster's formulation of self-defense presumes an armed
attack or imminent threat of armed attack to justify an armed response.6
Real and ongoing threats signal immediacy-though immediacy is not
defined by international law.65 Force is only permitted in cases where
the immediacy of attack is abundantly clear and great. 66 A response in
self-defense must take place close in time to the attack so that the
relationship of the response to the attack is evident. 6 7 Response timing
holds importance, as a state may not use force in self-defense long after
an attack has concluded, or to deter non-imminent future aggression.68
3. Necessity
Daniel Webster described necessity best as a threat that must be
instant and overwhelming, leaving no other choice.6 9 Necessity requires
the existence of a danger and the nonexistence of reasonable peaceful
alternatives.70 A state may only use force in response to a threat if no
other reasonable means of addressing the threat exist.7 1 A response
aimed at stopping an immediate, unavoidable threat would satisfy the
necessity requirement.7 2 State attempts to first peacefully resolve the
threat, if practical, before using force are helpful in demonstrating the
necessity to use force.
62. Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 Wis. INT'L L.J. 325, 325 (1999); see 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 420 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 8th ed. 1992).

63. Kearley, supra note 62, at 325.
64. Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The CarolineIncident and the Development
ofInternationalLaw, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 493, 501-02 (1990).

65. Zayac, supra note 46, at 451.
66. Rogoff& Collins, supra note 64, at 506.
67. Wrachford, supra note 50, at 70.
68. Mikael Nabati, InternationalLaw at a Crossroads: Self-Defense, Global Terrorism,
and Preemption (A Call to Rethink the Self-Defense Normative Framework), 13 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 771, 777 (2003).

69. WEBSTER, supra note 61, at 110
70. Lee Stuesser, Active Defense: State Military Response to International Terrorism, 17
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 4, 31 (1987).
71. Rogoff& Collins,supra note 64, at 498.
72. Karl M. Meessen, UnilateralRecourse to Military ForceAgainst TerroristAttacks, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 341, 349 (2003).
73. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620,
1635 (1984); Zayac, supranote 46, at 451.
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4. Proportionality
According to Secretary Webster, proportionality permits use of force
only as necessary to counter a threat and requires use of force to not be
unreasonable or excessive. 74 Thus, an action in self-defense that greatly
exceeds the imminent threat will be viewed as illegally
disproportionate. 7 5 An isolated attack confined to a given location
generally would not warrant a counter action that invades the territory
of the aggressor state far separate from the original location of conflict
unless necessary to alleviate the threat.7 6 A response to a threat is not
unreasonable or excessive if limited to the necessity of alleviating or
removing the threat. It must be aimed at repelling an attack or
restoring the status quo.7 8
B. U.N. Charter
The use of force, once governed only by customary international law
set out by Secretary Webster's CarolineDoctrine, found codification in
the U.N. Charter. The Charter, similar to the Caroline Doctrine,
severely limited the situations where one sovereign state could use force
against another. Most importantly, however, a state's ability to use force
in self-defense endured under the Charter.
1. Article 2(4)
The modem law onjus ad bellum is found in the Charter.7 9 War (and
other uses of force) was thought to have been outlawed upon passage of
the Charter.80 The Charter asserts a strict prohibition against the use of
74. Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 545 (2002); Zayac,
supra note 46, at 451-52.
75. Schachter, supra note 73, at 1637. Proportionality in the context of jus ad bellum
should not be confused with the term as used in the context ofjus in bello. Proportionality injus
in bello refers to the fundamental law of war principle that the loss of civilian life and damage to
civilian property must not be excessive when compared to the military advantage gained.
Wrachford, supra note 50, at 87.
76. Schachter, supra note 73, at 1637-38.
77. See Wallace F. Warriner, The UnilateralUse of Coercion UnderInternationalLaw: A
Legal Analysis of the United States Raid on Libya on April 14, 1986, 37 NAVAL L. REv. 49, 59
(1988); Zayac, supra note 46, at 452-53.
78. Nabati, supra note 68, at 778.
79. Rogoff & Collins, supra note 64, at 505. The Charter was established on October 24,
1945. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 211 (2005).

80. Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, Walking an InternationalLaw Tightrope: Use of Military
Force to Counter Terrorism-Willing the Ends, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 405, 411 (2006);
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force.8 ' The Charter requires member states to "settle their international
disputes by peaceful means. . . ."82 But it restricts the United Nations
from intervention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state. .. " Article 2(4) is the key provision of the
Charter for controlling and preventing conflict and aggression. 84 it
requires members to "refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force" to resolve disputes.8 5 Any clear, direct threat
violates the Charter.86 While Article 2(4) expressly limits threat or use
of force intending to violate a state's territorial integrity or political
independence, any attack that trespasses on a state's territory likely
violates the Article.87 The Charter delineates two exceptions to the
prohibition on the use of force: self-defense upon an armed attack and
use of force authorized by the U.N. Security Council.
2. Article 51
Article 51 codifies when states can resort to the use of force in selfdefense. 89 The Article states:
Nothing in the present Chapter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
Schachter, supra note 73, at 1620.
81. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4.; 1 BRUNO SIMMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
A COMMENTARY 123 (2d ed. 2002); Timothy Kearley, Regulation of Preventive and Preemptive
Force in the United Nations Charter: A Search for OriginalIntent, 3 WYo. L. REV. 663, 669
(2003).
82. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 3. ("[ajll Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.").
83. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 7. ("[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state. . . .").
84. Thomas Graham, Jr., NationalSelf-Defense, InternationalLaw, and Weapons of Mass
Destruction,4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2003); Zayac, supra note 46, at 439.
85. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4. ("[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state. . . .").
86. Graham, supra note 84, at 8.
87. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 265-68
(1963); Maogoto, supra note 80, at 412 (stating that "[t]he terms 'territorial integrity' and
'political independence' include most forms of armed force .. . incursion into the territory of
another state constitutes an infringement of Article 2(4), even if ... invading troops are meant to
withdraw immediately after completing a temporary and limited operation.").
88. SIMMA, supra note 81, at 125-28; Schachter, supra note 73, at 1620.
89. Zayac, supra note 46, at 440.
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peace and security ...
.90
In authorizing self-defense, Article 51 legitimizes certain acts of
force which would otherwise be illegal.9 ' The United Nations intended
Articles 2(4) and 51 to work together even though Article 51 is the only
exception allowing a state to use force (prior to U.N. approval) without
being labeled an aggressor. 92
Article 51 does not explicitly list or require any prerequisite
conditions prior to a state asserting self-defense as a justification for the
use of force.9 3 But, customary international law requires the
prerequisites of immediacy, necessity, and proportionality. 94 As part of
Article 51, the "inherent right" of self-defense refers to and includes the
customar7 international law rights to self-defense that pre-dated the
Charter. 9 In a 198696 dispute between Nicaragua and the United
States, 97 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed that the Article
90. U.N. Charter art. 51.
91.

INGRID DETTER DE LuPis, THE LAW OF WAR 173 (1987).

92. Zayac, supra note 46, at 445. It preserves a state's inherent right to determine whether
an armed attack has taken place against it, as long as it is not made in error, without being
treated as an aggressor in violation of Article 2(4). Id. at 448.
93. Id. at 449. The Article requires an "armed attack" but there is substantial debate over
whether the term means an actual, direct armed attack. Robert F. Teplitz, Taking Assassination
Attempts Seriously: Didthe United States Violate InternationalLaw in ForcefullyResponding to
the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569, 581 (1995). An armed attack
always violates Article 2(4) while not all violations of Article 2(4) are armed attacks legalizing
the right to self-defense under Article 51. SIMMA, supra note 81, at 796.
94. Zayac, supra note 46, at 450.
95.

CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 98 (2d ed. 2004);

Kearley, supra note 62, at 327; Rogoff & Collins, supra note 64, at 506. A counter (restrictive)
view exists that holds Article 51 substantially narrowed the right of self-defense as it existed
under customary international law prior to the Charter and must be in response to an armed
attack. Kearley, supra note 62, at 669-70. Adoption of this view would require states to suffer an
armed attack before responding, perhaps no longer with the capacity to be able to respond. D.W.
BOwETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191-92 (1958). For the purpose of this Article

it is not necessary to explore this counter view because Russia asserts that it invaded Georgia in
response to an actual armed attack on its citizens which would satisfy either view on the right to
self-defense.
96. Id. at 94, 103; Kearley, supra note 62, at 327. "It cannot therefore be held that Article
51 is a provision which 'subsumes and supervenes' customary international law. It rather
demonstrates that . . . customary international law continues to exist alongside treaty law."
Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 94. The Third Restatement of U.S. Foreign
Relations Law asserts that when international judicial tribunals rely on a doctrine, it greatly
shows that the doctrine is accepted international law. Teplitz, supra note 93, at 579; see also
SIMMA, supra note 81, at 133-35 (stating that the majority of international law commentators
consider Articles 2(4) and 51 to be part of customary international law, and the ICJ adopted this
view).
97. The ICJ ruled against the United States for violating international law by supporting
the contra opposition to the Nicaraguan government (including placing mines in the Nicaraguan
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51 right of self-defense already existed and continues to exist as a
matter of customary international law. It also essentially adopted the
CarolineDoctrine by explicitly recognizing the customary international
law requirements of immediacy, necessity, and proportionality. 98
Therefore, Article 51 incorporates and codifies the Caroline Doctrine
delineating how states may respond to an armed attack.99
3. The CarolineDoctrine in the Charter Era
Particularly since the Charter was formed, the Caroline Doctrine's
application, as customary international law, has expanded to all uses of
force in self-defense by states.100 The Caroline Doctrine and the
requirements of immediacy, necessity, and proportionality remain
applicable as a way to interpret the Charter and as an alternative source
of law.' 0 ' The elements of immediacy, necessity, and proportionality are
accepted as part of customary international law in addition to the
requirements of Article 51. 102
4. Defense of Nationals Abroad
International law does not blindly ignore situations where the safety
of a state's nationals is threatened within the territory of another state.
Ignoring such situations would be contrary to the Charter's intent to
respect and protect human rights. Under customary international law, a
state may protect its citizens abroad if they are in danger and the host
state is unable or unwilling to protect them.' 03 Under a social contract
territorial sea) while the United States contended that Nicaragua's support (supplying arms) to
guerillas fighting against El Salvador constituted an armed attack against El Salvador. Military
and Paramilitary Activities [(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)] (holding that assistance to
rebels by providing weapons does not equal an armed attack, and in customary international law
collective self-defense is illegal without a request for assistance from the victim state).
98. Glennon, supra note 74, at 545; Motala & ButleRitchie, supra note 46, at 11; Zayac,
supra note 46, at 450-51; see SIMMA, supra note 81, at 793 (stating that the ICJ considers that
Article 51 and the right of self-defense under customary international law coincide).
99. Kearley, supra note 62, at 327; see Ronald St. John Macdonald, The Use of Force by
States in InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 717, 721

(Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991).
100. Kearley, supra note 62, at 325. One of four accepted sources of international law
listed by Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, International custom or customary international law
results through common and continuous practice and observance of states as opiniojuris.INT'L
& OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CTR. AND SCH., U.S.

ARMY, 57TH GRADUATE COURSE DESKBOOK VOL. I (Aug. 2008) at B-3-4.

101. Kearley, supra note 62, at 327.
102. See Macdonald, supra note 99, at 721.
103. Schachter, supra note 73, at 1630; Gregory Travalio, Terrorism, InternationalLaw,
and the Use of Military Force, 18 Wis. INT'L L.J. 145, 160-61 (2000); see BOWErr, supra note
95, at 87-88. This right is recognized by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel,
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theory between a state and its citizens, a wrong against a citizen is a
wrong against the state, and the state must protect its citizens whether at
home or abroad.'1 There must be an imminent threat of injury to a
state's citizens, a failure or inability of the host state to protect them,
and measures of protection must be strictly confined to protecting the
citizens from harm.1 05 The use of force by a state may be defined as
self-defense provided that the state complies with the principles of
necessity, proportionality, and immediacy.106 This places the use of
force in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter. The principle of
proportionality requires that any invasion for the purpose of protecting a
state's citizens abroad must be terminated as soon as possible with
minimal encroachment on the territorial sovereignty of the host state. 0 7
The right of self-defense exists as long as it is limited to that necessary
to protect the nationals from harm.'0 s A state's actions will be judged in
hindsight, and, therefore, states are cautioned to limit their use of force
as much as possible.
This form of armed intervention in self-defense has generally been
justified by the necessity of quick action to save the lives of innocents
where the host government is unwilling or unable to act. 109 Without
action, innocent nationals abroad would have no means of protection.
Action in self-defense may only be taken where there is no other way to
protect the nationals and the danger is real and immediate.110 All
and numerous other states and has never been contradicted by U.N. action. Warriner, supra note
77, at 65. Under Article 51, use of force in self-defense is permitted if an armed attack has
occurred which includes an attack on a state's citizens abroad. Antonio Cassese, The
InternationalCommunity's "Legal" Response to Terrorism, 38 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 589, 596
(1989).
104. Nikolai Krylov, HumanitarianIntervention: Pros and Cons, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 365, 377 (1995).
105.

YoRAM DINsTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 231 (4th ed. 2005).

106. Id. In other words, the customary international law requirements promulgated in the
Carolinedoctrine must be met. Rogoff & Collins, supra note 64, at 502. Israel's ambassador to
the United Nations cited the Caroline doctrine as justification for Israel's actions to protect its
nationals abroad at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda in 1976. Graham, supra note 84, at 7. Some
international law experts assert another basis for intervention-the protection of nationals
abroad does not violate Article 2(4) because the use or threat of use is not a breach of the
territorial integrity or political independence of a state. Richard B. Lillich, ForcibleSelf Help
Under InternationalLaw, in NATIONAL SECuRITY LAW 129 (John Norton Moore & Robert F.
Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005); Schachter, supra note 73, at 1632. While this argument is recognized,
Russia asserted a right to self-defense under Article 51 in protecting its citizens in Georgian
territory. Furthermore, most governments hold that any forcible entry into another state's
territory violates its territorial integrity regardless of the justification making the Article 2(4)
prohibition of the use of force applicable to protection of nationals abroad. Id.
107. BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 265; DINsTEIN, supra note 105, at 232.
108. Schachter, supra note 73, at 1630.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1631.
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diplomatic and political options should be exhausted before using force.
The legitimacy of self-defense to protect a state's citizens abroad is
based on the nexus of citizenship and it is inapplicable to noncitizens."' In order for a state to invoke a right to self-defense of its

nationals abroad, the harm to its citizens must be significant and at the
direction or omission of another state.112 Because any action likely
violates the territorial integrity of another state, it should only be used in
exceptional circumstances, as a last resort, and where tremendous harm
is imminent. Russia's actions in Georgia will be judged by these
standards.
5. Reprisal
Russia's actions may be judged as retaliation against Georgia for
past wrongs since the actions occurred long after troubles between the
two states had begun.11 3 All uses of force must be justified as selfdefense under Article 51, and reprisals, once lawful, are no longer
permitted under any circumstances. 1 14 A reprisal comes after an event
where the harm has already taken place and can no longer be defended
against.
Legitimate self-defense is limited to repellin an armed
attack and cannot be for retaliatory or punitive reasons." While the
Charter does not specifically address reprisal, the U.N. General
Assembly affirmatively declared that states must not commit
reprisals." Incorporation of the CarolineDoctrine as part of Article 51
ensures that states do not act in retaliation.' 18 In order to not constitute a
reprisal, Russia's actions must not have been an effort to inflict harm on
Georgia for a previous disagreement, and must have been legally
justified.
6. Humanitarian Intervention
While Russia asserted defense of its nationals abroad as the lawful
basis for its invasion of Georgian territory, humanitarian intervention is
111. DINsTErN, supra note 105, at 234; see BowETT, supra note 95, at 94-96. The legality
of humanitarian intervention for non-citizens is reviewed in Part VI.B.6. of this Article.
112. Warriner, supra note 77, at 61. The ICJ has suggested that there must be a substantial
degree of control by a state over individual acts for those acts to be credited to the state.
Travalio, supra note 103, at 152.
113. See generally infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the Georgia-Russia
conflict history).
114. Maogoto, supra note 80, at 420; Rogoff& Collins, supra note 64, at 510.
115. Warriner, supra note 77, at 59.
116. SIMMA,supra note 81, at 670.
117. Warriner, supra note 77, at 55.
118. Graham, supra note 84, at 7.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol23/iss1/3

16

Chatham: Defense of Nationals Abroad: The Legitimacy of Russia's Invasion

2011]

DEFENSE OF NATIONALS ABROAD: THE LEGITIMACY OF RUSSIA'S INVASION OF GEORGIA

91

another possible basis to legitimize Russia's actions. The doctrine of
humanitarian intervention allows a unilateral action that infringes on
another state's territorial sovereignty to prevent that state from
committing human rights violations against its citizens. 11 9 It is best
justified as a necessary action against a state's sovereignty where that
state acts contrary to general concepts of humanity.120 In such cases, use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the
state acting contrary to the laws of humanity is legitimized. Russia's
actions, under this doctrine, would have been to prevent Georgia from
continuing to commit human rights violations against the residents of
South Ossetia.
Some consider humanitarian intervention to encompass defense of a
state's nationals abroad.121 Protecting one's nationals abroad should be
justified as a form of legitimate self-defense.' 22 The Charter prohibits
the threat or use of force, with self-defense and the authorization of the
Security Council being the only express exceptions to this prohibition.
Intervening on behalf of another state's citizens cannot be interpreted as
self-defense.123 This makes defense of a state's citizens abroad distinct
from humanitarian intervention and a much stronger argument for
Russia's intervention in Georgia.
However, with state sovereignty a critical principle of international
law, the Preamble to the Charter may support humanitarian
interventionl24 as it calls on Member States "to ensure, by the
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force
shall not be used, save in the common interest." 25 Furthermore, the
119. Barry M. Benjamin, Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention: Legalizing the Use of
Force to Prevent Human Rights Atrocities, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 120, 120 (1992).
120. Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian
Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 277 (1973). Both St. Thomas Aquinas
and Hugo Grotius supported such a position. See Krylov, supra note 104, at 368. Aquinas
declared that where a state treats its citizens in a way contrary to that which is acceptable,
another state had the right to intervene. Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International
Law Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 214 (1974). Grotius similarly opined that society had a right to intervene
when a state unjustly mistreated its citizens. HuGo GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 584
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925). For further discussion, see also Nichholas
Onuf, HumanitarianIntervention: The Early Years, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 753 (2004).
121. Krylov, supra note 104, at 368.
122. See id. at 380.
123. Id.
124. See Benjamin, supra note 119, at 141, 149. Another argument in support of the
legality of humanitarian intervention is that it does not violate Article 2(4) because it does not
breach another state's territorial integrity or political independence. Id.
125. U.N. Charter pmbl. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966
Covenant of Human Rights, the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights, the 1975 Helsinki
Accords, and the Copenhagen Declaration, as well as the ICJ's recognition of an obligation to
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Preamble seeks "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity of and worth of the human person. . . ."l2 6 As a member of the
United Nations or through treaty obligations, a state may limit its
authority or sovereignty but strengthen its security and receive
additional benefits.' 27 Its authority may be limited with regard to its
treatment of its nationals. But without action by the Security Council,
using humanitarian intervention as a justification for the use of force is
a much weaker argument than the defense of one's nationals abroad as
it is not broadly accepted as legitimate. This is likely the reason, in
addition to Russia's claim that the South Ossetian residents it was
protecting were Russian nationals, that Russia did not claim
humanitarian intervention as justification.
For any possible legitimate justification of humanitarian
intervention, it must only be employed in extreme circumstances of
widespread abuse involving a large number of people.128 Georgia's
treatment of the South Ossetian residents is debatable. Georgia claimed
that any armed action it took against South Ossetia was to reclaim and
control its own territory. Russia painted a very different story of
Georgia targeting and harming South Ossetian residents. But Russia
would have a difficult time showing an extreme circumstance of
Georgia committing widespread abuse.
Even if Russia could show that widespread abuse took place, use of
force should be the last action after collective responses.12 Using force
alone, without the cooperation of additional states or organizations
might imply an impermissible action in violation of Article 2(4).13
Therefore, humanitarian intervention should only take place when no
other alternative or solution exists. The response should be on par with
the human rights violations. 131 Russia acted alone before any attempt at
a collective action was made other than filing a protest with the United
Nations. Enlisting the United Nations or other states to help stop the
conflict in South Ossetia were viable options that Russia ignored.
Because the legality of humanitarian intervention is tenuous at best, and
respect human rights, further support the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in violation of
a state's sovereignty. Krylov, supra note 104, at 374-75.
126. U.N. Charter pmbl. Use of force consistent with principles of the Charter pertaining to
human rights and not directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state
in violation of Article 2(4) may be legitimate. Krylov, supra note 104, at 383.
127. Id. at 375.
128. Benjamin, supranote 119, at 153-54.
129. Krylov, supra note 104, at 385.
130. See Benjamin, supra note 119, at 130. The legislative history of the Charter indicates
that the drafters intended the use of force to be illegal in all cases except those expressly stated.
Id. This defeats any reading or interpretation of the Preamble and other provisions of the Charter
as supportive of the concept of humanitarian intervention. Id.
131. Krylov, supra note 104, at 392.
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Russia would have a hard time showing it responded to an extreme
circumstance of widespread abuse, Russia was wise in using protection
of its nationals abroad as its justification rather than the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention.

VII. RUSSIAN CITIZENSHIP
Russia's claim that it was defending its citizens within the sovereign
Georgian territory of South Ossetia rests entirely on the validity of that
citizenship. Without certain South Ossetian residents having Russian
citizenship, Russia would have little legal justification, if any, for
protecting those residents. The ICJ indentified nationality as the factor
that allows a state to protect its citizens in the Nottebohm case.' 32 A
state can only afford diplomatic protections to its own nationals.
Friedrich Nottebohm was born in Germany in 1881 and retained
German citizenship until 1939 when he applied for naturalization in
Liechtenstein in order to avoid ties with Germany shortly after the
opening of World War II.133 Beginning in 1905, he lived in Guatemala
and conducted all his business activities there.1 4 Prior to applying for
naturalization, Nottebohm's connections to Liechtenstein were very
tenuous other than a few visits to see his brother who began living there
in 1931.135 Even after applying for naturalization, he continued to have
his permanent residence in Guatemala.' 36 The ICJ decided that the grant
of nationality by Liechtenstein did not obligate Guatemala to recognize
the grant even though it may have been valid under Liechtenstein's
domestic law.1 37 Liechtenstein failed to show that Nottebohm had closer
ties to it than any other state at the time of his naturalization.1 38
Nottebohm's connections to Guatemala were long and close, while he
had no bond with Liechtenstein, and the naturalization did not alter his
lifestyle.1 39 International law has absorbed the Nottebohm holding as the
general rule.
International law does not restrict a state's right to confer
citizenship; rather, it limits the recognition by other states of

132. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 13 (Apr. 6, 1955) (holding that the
nationality Liechtenstein conferred on Nottebohm could not be relied upon against Guatemala
making Liechtenstein's claim inadmissible based on international law).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 26.
138. Id. at 24-26.
139. Id. at 26.
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unreasonable grants of citizenship.140 Every state is entitled, within its
own domestic jurisdiction, to determine its own rules regarding the
grant of citizenship, and the grant shall be recognized by other states as
long as it is consistent with international law.'14 Likewise, Russia was
entitled to grant citizenship to South Ossetian residents. But that grant
must have been consistent with international law for Georgia and other
states to be required to recognize it. In order to be a bona fide national
of a state recognized as such by international law, there must be a
"genuine link" between the national and the state.142 The ICJ cited
strong factual ties between the person whose nationality is questioned
and the states involved as well as the habitual residence, center of
interests, family ties, participation in public life, intentions for the
future, traditions, activities, and attachment shown by the person for a
given country as key factors taken into consideration when determining
a state's right to exercise protection over that person.143 The person
must be more closely connected with the population of the state
conferring citizenship than with any other state.144 There must be a
genuine connection between a person and a state that wishes to protect
him or her against other states. It is questionable, at best, whether such a
genuine connection existed between the residents of South Ossetia
granted citizenship and Russia.
If the residents of South Ossetia had never visited or entered the
territory of Russia, their relationship with Russia would be even more
tenuous than Nottebohm's relationship with Liechtenstein.145 The
longer a person resides in and contributes to a state, the greater the
nexus between that state and the naturalization it confers on the
person.146 Obtaining naturalization has been dependent on the

140. Robert D. Sloane, Breaking the Genuine Link: The ContemporaryInternationalLegal
Regulation ofNationality, 50 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (2009).
141. See id. at 7.
142. Id. at 1; see LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 374, 396 (6th ed.
2003). "For purposes of international law, an individual has the nationality of a state that confers
it, but other states need not accept that nationality when it is not based on a genuine link
between the state and the individual." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 211 (1987).

143. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 22-24.
144. Id. at 23.
145. See, e.g., Pasha L. Hsieh, An UnrecognizedState in Foreign andInternationalCourts:
The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 765, 812 (2007). This
Article does not go into investigative depth regarding the genuine connection between the
naturalized South Ossetian residents and Russia. The Article ventures beyond whether Russia
could prove a genuine link that would enable it to protect its citizens in South Ossetia so that the
legitimacy of the defense of those citizens can be evaluated.
146. Yaffa Zilbershats, Reconsidering the Concept of Citizenship, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 689,
710 (2001).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol23/iss1/3

20

Chatham: Defense of Nationals Abroad: The Legitimacy of Russia's Invasion

2011]

DEFENSE OF NATIONALS ABROAD: THE LEGITIMACY OF RUSSIA S INVASION OF GEORGIA

95

precondition of residence. 147 Previous attempts by a state to confer
citizenship on all persons within a given radius or of a certain political
persuasion have failed to gain recognition at an international level.148
The specific intent behind a person's naturalization by a state must be
evaluated.149 Therefore, if Russia simply wanted to expand its reach and
control by naturalizing residents within the limits of South Ossetia,
without more, it likely would not have to be recognized by other states.
The naturalized residents did not reside in Russia, so any nexus created
by their contributions to Russia were tenuous. As residents of sovereign
Georgian territory, the greater nexus existed between them and Georgia.
Without residency in Russia, the other factors considered by the ICJ in
the Nottebohm case must be evaluated. Though residency is the primary
factor, the ethnicity, interests, family ties, traditions, future intentions,
and activities of naturalized South Ossetian residents may all have
related to Russia and shown a stronger nexus to that nation. Among the
factors to consider are that the Soviet Union established the Ossetian
region, and the Soviet Union, after its collapse, eventually evolved into
the Russian Federation.' 5 0 Additionally, the region is split in half with
the north part of Russia and the south part of Georgia."' After
evaluating the other factors, perhaps a genuine connection could be
found between the naturalized South Ossetian residents and Russia.
Failure to show such a connection-a huge obstacle because the South
Ossetians were not residents of Russia-would defeat Russia's claim
that it was defending its nationals abroad.
VIII. ANALYSIS
Although Russia would have a hard time proving that the citizenship
it bestowed on residents of South Ossetia must be recognized by other
states under international law, Russia stated a lawful justification under
the Charter and customary international law for its actions in Georgia.
Assuming Russia could prove the South Ossetians were its nationals,
the justification must be reviewed to determine its legitimacy and
whether it was a pretext. To be legitimate, Russia must have acted for
the limited purpose of self-defense of its nationals residing in Georgian
territory.

147. See id. at 713. Residence is a requirement for naturalization in the United States. Id. at
714.
148. Sloane, supra note 140, at 3.
149. See id. at 11.
150. ROUDIK, supra note 9, at 2.

151. Id
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A. Article 2(4) Violation
Russia defended its intervention into Georgia as a legitimate act of
self-defense of its nationals in Georgian territory under Article 51.152
Article 2(4) proscribes any threat or use of force that violates the
territorial integrity of another state.153 Once Russia crossed into South
Ossetia, part of Georgian territory, and took up arms, it violated Article
2(4). In order for Russia to protect its nationals from mistreatment by
Georgia, Russian forces would have to confront and possibly engage
Georgian forces. But Russia's actions were specifically directed at the
Georgian government and armed forces. Its use of force was not limited
in any way to avoid confrontation and engagement with Georgia or to
minimize the impact or degree of force to that necessary to rescue its
nationals.154 Russia encroached on the territorial integrity of Georgia
(initially into South Ossetia and then further into Georgian territory)
defying the Charter's prohibition on the use of force.s5 5 Russia's
invasion of Georgian territory was a violation of international law
unless further legitimate justification existed for its actions.
B. Article 51 Exception
Russia justified its actions as self-defense-an exception to the
Charter's prohibition on the use of force. Article 51 requires an armed
attack in order for Russia to avail itself of the self-defense exception to
the Charter. Did the alleged attack by Georgia on Russian citizens
within its territory constitute an armed attack against Russia? Ample
dispute exists as to Georgia's motivation for military attacks on parts of
South Ossetia. 156 Georgia asserts that it was trying to regain control of
its territory in South Ossetia. 1s7 Russia contends that Georgia attacked
Russian citizens living in South Ossetia, or, at the very least, did not act
to protect them.' 5 8 While Georgia's motives remain unclear, Russian
citizens living in South Ossetia must have suffered some form of armed
aggression by Georgian forces causing harm, direct or indirect, to
152. Letter from Vitaly Churkin, supra note 36.
153. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
154. See generally Peter Worthington, Russia Taught the World a Lesson on How to Win a
War, KINGSTON WIG-STAND (Ontario), Aug. 18, 2008, Ed./Op., at 4 (comparing Russia's
invasion of Georgia to the U.S. invasion of Panama and asserting that Russia lured Georgian
forces into the South Ossetian conflict as an excuse to inflict damage on Georgia).
155. See Wrachford, supra note 50, at 77.
156. See Maginnis, supra note 13.
157. See id. But see Chivers & Barry, supra note 22, at Al (alleging that indiscriminate
armed attacks by Georgia exposed civilians, Russian peacekeepers and observers to harm).
158. See id. (stating that Russia believed Georgia was involved in ethnic cleansing in South
Ossetia).
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trigger any possible right for Russia to intervene. That attack and
Russia's response to it must meet the customary international law
requirements of the Caroline doctrine incorporated into Article 51 for
any intervention to have been legitimate.' 5 9
C. The Defense ofRussian Citizens
Russia's justification rests on the premise that defense of its citizens
in Georgia can be self-defense.' 60 Georgia's alleged armed attack on or
affecting Russian citizens would constitute an armed attack on Russia
itself.1 While the extent of Georgia's armed aggression against
Russian citizens is unclear, any use of force by Georgia against Russian
citizens living within its borders would largely be considered an armed
attack on Russia.162 Based on the assumption of an armed attack by
Georgia against Russian citizens of some degree, Russia may avail itself
of the Article 51 self-defense exception as long as it meets the
requirements of the Caroline doctrine.' 6 3 This also assumes that
Russia's justification is not a pretext for other political motives.1 64
1. Immediate Threat to Russian Citizens
In order for Russia to act in self-defense, the threat to its citizens
must have been tantamount to an emergency where there is an imminent
threat of injury.16 5 Georgia's antagonism of South Ossetia, regardless of
the true motive, was actual armed aggression that had taken place over a
prolonged period of time. 166 There had been conflict between Georgia
and its semi-autonomous province (i.e., South Ossetia) for a

159. See generally supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (discussing the Caroline
doctrine and Article 51).
160. See generally supra note 106 and accompanying text (commenting on the weakness of
the minority view that defense of nationals abroad is humanitarian intervention outside of
Article 2(4)'s prohibition on the use of force). Based on this, Russia's only justification can be
self-defense.
161. See Schachter, supra note 73, at 1632 .
162.

See DINSTEIN, supranote 105, at 231.

163. See id.
164. See Schachter, supra note 73, at 1631.
165. See generally supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text (discussing the defense of
nationals abroad).
166. See Ivan Simic, Georgia vs. S. Ossetia: From Conflict to Major War, PALESTINE
CHRON., Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.palestine chronicle.com/viewarticle details.php?id=14066
(last visited Jan. 24, 2011). After increased tensions beginning in 2003, two months of
continuous fighting between Georgia and South Ossetia turned severe on August 1, 2008
(approximately 1500 civilians, 15 Russian peacekeepers, and several dozen South Ossetian
fighters died). Id.
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considerable time.167 However, Russia's response was within days of
the last action. 16 8 The conflict was still ongoing at the time Russia
responded.169 Assuming Russian citizens had suffered some form of
continuing armed attack by Georgia, Secretary Webster's definition of
immediacy was met. Because the conflict was still ongoing when Russia
intervened, there was an immediate threat to any legitimate Russian
nationals.
2. Necessity of Russian Action
For Russia's invasion of Georgia to have been necessary, there must
have been a failure or inability for Georgia to protect Russia's
citizens.170 By its very nature, since the Georgian government supported
and condoned the armed attacks by its forces on South Ossetia, if they
affected Russian citizens, Georgia indirectly failed to specifically
protect Russia's citizens. This may show the necessity of limited action
by Russia to protect its citizens. If Russia needed to protect its nationals
in South Ossetia, it would need to degrade Georgia's ability to attack
them. To do so, Russia would have a legitimate need to expand
operations beyond South Ossetia to degrade Georgia's centers of gravity
and quell its military abilities. This degradation effort would be similar
to the U.S. operations in the 1991 Gulf War that expanded into Iraqi
territory to hamper Iraq's centers of gravity and ability to encroach on
Kuwaiti territory. Russian actions limited to subduing Georgia's ability
to harm Russian nationals might have been legitimate use of force in
self-defense.
However, by occupying Georgia for over two months, and
advancing well beyond the conflict area in South Ossetia, Russia's
potentially legitimate intervention in Georgia turned into an illegal
encroachment of the territorial integrity of Georgia. The legality of
Russia's invasion rested precariously on the necessity of it doing no
more than rescuing its citizens and getting them out of Georgia. Instead,
Russia continued to occupy Georgia long after securing its citizens'
safety in a politically motivated effort to restrict Georgia and other
former Soviet satellites from shifting away from Russian allegiances to
more western pro-democratic alliances.' 7 '
167. See Maginnis, supra note 13 (illustrating that South Ossetia and Georgia have been in
conflict since 1920, and the conflict escalated after Georgia's Rose Revolution in 2003).
168. See Simic, supra note 166 (pointing out that Russia's advance into Georgian territory
came on August 8, 2008 after days of intense fighting between Georgia and South Ossetia).
Suspiciously, however, Russia's invasion came during the Olympics when the world's media
attention was focused on Beijing, China-an opportune time. Maginnis, supra note 13.
169. See Simic, supranote 166.
170. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
171. See Maginnis, supra note 13 (asserting Russia wanted to contain relationships
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Similarly, the necessity for Russia's action in defense of its citizens
could only have existed if all alternatives had been exhausted. 172 Russia
did not have to exhaust remedies that would have been futile.173 By its
own doing, Russia failed to meet this requirement. Russia's first
correspondence with the United Nations regarding the safety of its
citizens in Georgia came via its letter justifying the invasion. 174 There is
little evidence that Russia sought to protect its citizens through peaceful
solutions with Georgia. Russia may have been able to conduct an
evacuation of its citizens from South Ossetia to a safe haven in Russia if
they were truly in danger due to its close proximity bordering South
Ossetia. Petitioning the United Nations for a strong peacekeeping force
would have offered Russia another peaceful remedy. Thus, because
there were several alternative means to protect its nationals in Georgia,
Russia's invasion failed to meet the necessity requirement.
3. Proportionality of Russia's Invasion
The proportionality element of self-defense required Russia to limit
its actions strictly to what was necessary to protect its nationals.' 7 5 This
restricted Russia to an intervention no further than South Ossetia.
Russia's response became disproportional when Russia invaded Georgia
well past the South Ossetian area of conflict.176 The action also ceased
to be proportional when the invasion lasted long past the short time
necessary to go into Georgia and secure the safety of Russian
citizens.
Russia continued to occupy Georgia likely due to political
motives other than the safety of its citizens. The limited armed actions
necessary to evacuate Russian citizens from South Ossetia would have
been the proportional response to assure their safety. Russia's actions
were not proportional to the threat, especially when compared to other
defense of nationals abroad cases.
D. Case Comparisons
Israel's 1976 intervention into Uganda to rescue its citizens held
hostage at the Entebbe airport demonstrates the most appropriate case of
use of force in defense of a state's nationals abroad (although it
between former Soviet republics and western states particularly after international recognition of
Kosovo's independence).
172. See supra notes 69-73, 103-12 and accompanying text.
173. See Schachter,supra note 73, at 1631.
174. See Letter from Vitaly Churkin, supra note 36.
175. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 74-78, 103-12 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

25

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3

100

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23

involved a much smaller population of nationals).1 78 The Ugandan
government was complicit in taking Israeli hostages as part of a political
action against Israel. 1 The Israeli hostages faced imminent danger or
death18 0 and were taken to Uganda by force against their will.18 ' Israel
executed a very limited rescue mission into Uganda to save the
hostages.182 Uganda aided an armed attack against Israeli nationals
justifying a response in self-defense under Article 51.183
In contrast, the United States primarily justified its 1983 invasion of
Grenada as protecting approximately one thousand of its citizens from
mass chaos.84 Little harm had been done to the U.S. nationals in
Grenada, and they were not being held involuntarily.'
Furthermore,
the U.S. incursion into Grenada lasted well beyond the time necessary
to evacuate and rescue its citizens and became an occupation. 186 The
United Nations condemned the United States for its actions violating
international law.' 8 7 The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in
1965 also received criticism when its forces did not withdraw
after evacuating its citizens. 188
immediately
Russia's intervention in Georgia finds many more similarities to the
Grenada example than the Entebbe model, even though Entebbe
involved a smaller number of nationals than South Ossetia. Like in
Uganda, if Russian citizens were harmed in South Ossetia, Georgia
played a direct part in it. However, the imminence of the danger
Russian nationals faced is debatable at best. More significantly, the
Russian citizens were very likely voluntarily residing in South Ossetia
178. See DINSTEIN, supra note 105, at 233; Warriner, supra note 77, at 67. Terrorists

hijacked an Air France plane carrying Israeli nationals and took it to Entebbe airport in Uganda
with the support of the Ugandan government. DINsTEIN, supra note 105, at 233.
179. Id.
180. Warriner, supra note 77, at 67.
181. DINsTEIN,supra note 105, at233.
182. Warriner, supra note 77, at 67.
183. See Schachter, supra note 73, at 1630. Governor Scranton, the U.S. representative on
the Security Council, affirmed the legitimacy of Israel's use of force because it was limited to
what was necessary to save the Israeli hostages. Id.; STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE
AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (1996). The United Nations never

officially judged the legitimacy of Israel's actions. Id. at 197; Warriner, supra note 77, at 67.
184. Warriner, supra note 77, at 66; DINsTEIN, supra note 105, at 232.
185. Schachter, supra note 73, at 1631; see ALEXANDROV, supra note 183, at 199.
186. DINsTEIN, supra note 105, at 232; ALEXANDROV, supra note 183, at 200. The
prolonged intervention thwarted the proportionality requirement of limited violation of a state's
territorial integrity. DINSTEIN, supra note 105, at 232
187. ALEXANDROV, supra note 183, at 200; Schachter, supra note 73, at 1632; Warriner,
supranote 77, at 66.
188. DINSTEIN, supra note 105, at 232; Warriner, supra note 77, at 66. The U.S. actions
were questioned even though the Dominican Republic government stated that it could not
protect the American nationals. Warriner, supra note 77, at 66.
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and free to leave at any time as they had Russian passports' and lived
in territory bordering Russia. 190 The northern half of Ossetia was
immediately adjacent to Russian territory.191 This fact, more than any
other, diminishes the danger the Russians encountered. Russian forces
occupied Georgia long past the time necessary to evacuate Russian
citizens' 92 and well beyond the area required to effect the evacuation.' 93
Once the Russian forces extended their stay, the response mirrored the
actions of the United States in Grenada and the Dominican Republic.
What may have originally been minimally justified by necessity turned
illegitimate; Russian forces tread on the territorial integrity and political
independence of Georgia.
In 1985, Israel attacked the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation
Organization in Tunisia, claiming that the action was undertaken to
provide safety for its citizens abroad.194 The U.N. Security Council
condemned Israel's actions as a reprisal for past wrongful events.' 95
Russia and Georgia had long antagonized each other over the semiautonomous territory of South Ossetia.196 This raises the possibility that
Russia's invasion may have been retaliatory for past wrongs. For Russia
to have acted in retaliation, the wrongful events and danger of harm
must have ceased.19 7 The Georgian armed aggression in South Ossetia
possibly affecting Russian nationals was ongoing at or near the time
Russia responded. Based on this, and without more, Russia's invasion
must be assumed not to be a reprisal, but still an illegitimate use of
force.
While perhaps not a reprisal, the length of time Russia occupied
Georgian territory subjects Russia's actions to heavy criticism.
Furthermore, Russia would struggle to show direct, continuous harm to
its citizens by Georgia, just as the United States could not present a case
of great harm to its nationals in Grenada. Some similarities exist
between previous examples of defense of nationals abroad and Russia's
actions. However, far more differences in the previous examples
highlight the inadequacy of Russia's justification for invading Georgia.
189. Putin Defends Russia's Ossetia Inclusion, Slams Georgia Over 'Genocide,'
HAARETZ.COM, Aug. 8, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/news/putin-defends-russia-s-ossetiinclusion-slams-georgia-over-genocide-1.251394 (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Warriner, supra note 77, at 67.
195. Id. at 67-68.
196. See Simic, supra note 166 (describing several crises between Georgia and Russia over
South Ossetia including Georgia firing missiles at Russian fighter jets and intercepting a
Russian military convoy).
197. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
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IX. CONCLUSION

In early August 2008, Georgia took action against its South Ossetian
region to protect its territorial integrity. Assuming Georgia's conduct
included some form of armed attack or harm affecting Russian nationals
in South Ossetia, Russia may have initially had the right to use armed
force against Georgia in self-defense of its citizens. To do so, however,
there must have been a "genuine connection" between Russia and the
residents of South Ossetia that it declared its nationals. This alone
would be very challenging for Russia because the South Ossetians'
residence was separate and outside of Russia. Russia's asserted
justification in invading Georgia in defense of its nationals abroad is
likely illegitimate based on the tenuous nexus between Russia and the
South Ossetians. Other states, including Georgia, likely would not have
recognized Russia's grant of citizenship. Therefore, Russia was not
acting to protect its nationals abroad. Furthermore, using a separate
justification such as humanitarian intervention would be weak because
of little evidence of extreme circumstances and widespread abuse in
South Ossetia. Russia acted alone without seeking a collective response.
Even if other states were required to recognize Russia's grant of
citizenship under international law, Russia seemingly could have
assisted its nationals in leaving South Ossetia. Without attempting to aid
in their peaceful evacuation, the Russian response in their defense was
not necessary. Although Georgia directly participated in any harm to
Russian citizens that may have occurred, the imminent danger the
Russians faced was marginal. In addition to Russia's initial intervention
in South Ossetia being unnecessary, the response was illegal because it
was disproportional and not a limited means to protect its citizens. What
was an unnecessary use of force further turned into a violation of
Georgia's territorial integrity. Russia failed to limit its operation to only
what was necessary to protect and evacuate its citizens. Protection of its
citizens may have required an incursion into Georgia beyond the limits
of South Ossetia to degrade Georgia's ability to attack them. However,
by crossing well into Georgia and invading its territory for an extended
period of time, Russia's invasion of that country was illegitimate and
not an act in self-defense. Ultimately, the Russian invasion of Georgia
violated the Charter and customary international law.
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